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TEARING DOWN THE FENCE AROUND
IMMIGRATION LAW: EXAMINING THE LACK
OF JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE IMPACT
OF THE REAL ID ACT WHILE CALLING
FOR A BROADER READING OF QUESTIONS OF
LAW TO ENCOMPASS "EXTREME CRUELTY"
Sarah A. Moore*
Nothing in subparagraph (B) or (C), or in any other provision of
this Act (other than this section) which limits or eliminates judicial
review, shall be construed as precluding review of constitutional
claims or questions of law raised upon a petition for review filed
with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this
section.
-REAL

ID Act of 20051

INTRODUCTION

One of the most consistent and often most frustrating themes in
immigration law is its limitation on judicial review in order to give
deference to the other branches of government, 2 possibly even when
it sacrifices judicial review for the victims of "extreme cruelty." 3 Simi* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2008.
1 Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, § 106(a)(1)(A)(iii), 119 Stat. 231,310 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D)). This section of the REAL ID Act created section
242(a) (2) (D) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).
2 See Moosa v. INS, 171 F.3d 994, 1011-12 (5th Cir. 1999) ("[T]he power of
courts to review deportation decisions is subject to the will of Congress .... 'The
power to expel aliens, being essentially a power of the political branches of government, the legislative and executive, may be exercised entirely through executive
officers, with such opportunity for judicial review of their action as [C]ongress may
see fit to authorize or permit. This power is, of course, subject to judicial intervention
under the paramount law of the constitution.'" (quoting Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S.
524, 537 (1952))).
3 Noncitizen victims of domestic violence who have suffered "extreme cruelty"
may qualify for a special form of relief from removal. See infra notes 95-104 and
2037
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lar to the way in which Congress has sought to insulate the United
States from undocumented immigrants by constructing a border
fence, 4 Congress has sought to insulate decisions of the Immigration
Judges (IJs) and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) from judicial review by Article III courts by passing explicit jurisdiction-stripping statutory provisions. Historically, the courts have held that
Congress has plenary power in the immigration context. Then, Congress more severely limited the courts' role with the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) 5 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA).6
Congress, by delegating the primary adjudication of immigration
cases to the executive branch, and by enacting jurisdiction-stripping
statutes, has left Article III courts basically uninvolved until a possible
petition for review to the courts of appeals. Yet, even the ability of a
noncitizen to reach that distant chance of judicial review is explicitly
barred in several broad, categorical cases, especially those regarding
7
discretionary decisions.
The passage of the REAL ID Act of 20058 significantly impacted
several areas of immigration law.9 Importantly, Congress explicitly
restored judicial review over "constitutional claims or questions of
law," despite any previous jurisdictional bars in this area of immigration law.10
accompanying text. "Extreme cruelty" includes actual or threatened violence, psychological or sexual abuse, and possibly other abusive acts in an overall pattern of violence. See8 C.F.R. § 204.2 (c)(1)(vi) (2006).
4 See Carl Hulse & Rachel L. Swarns, Senate Passes Bill on Building Border Fence,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2006, at A10; David Stout, Bush, SigningBill for BorderFence, Urges
Wider Overhaul, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2006, at A16.

5 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 8, 18, 22, 28, 40 & 42 U.S.C.).
6 Pub. L. No. 104-208 div. C, 110 Stat. 3009, (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8 & 18 U.S.C.); see infra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
7 See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252 (a) (2) (West 2005).
8 Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, 119 Stat. 231, 302 (to be codified in scattered sections of 8 & 49 U.S.C.).
9 Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of REAL 1D Act of
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, 11 A.L.R. FED. 2D 1, § 2, at 14 (2006) ("Other

portions of the REAL ID Act involve waiving laws that interfere with the construction
of physical barriers at the borders ....

updating and tightening the laws and proce-

dures on applications for asylum, removal, and deportation of aliens for terrorist
activity (8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1182, 1252 (West 2005)), funding some reports and pilot
projects related to border security .... and changing visa limits for temporary workers
(8 U.S.C.A. § 1184).").
10 See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(a) (2) (D) (West 2005); Linda S. Wendtland, Review of
ConstitutionalClaims and Questions of Law Under the REAL 1) Act, IMMIGR. LITIG. BULL.
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The question remains how the courts have responded to this ebb
and flow, this robbing and restoring of jurisdiction: Are the courts
abdicating their right to judicial review in light of the statutory bars or
reclaiming their traditional role as bodies of review? Are they narrowly interpreting prohibitions on judicial review of discretionary
decisions and broadly reading "constitutional claims or questions of
law" in order to find a role for the courts in an ever-controversial and
mistake-prone field? The courts agree that discretionary decisions by
the BIA are outside the courts' jurisdiction and are thus unreviewable, 1 but the REAL ID Act explicitly grants the courts the right to
review "constitutional claims or questions of law."1 2 Where the courts
disagree is on which decisions are discretionary-thus nonreviewable-and which decisions are questions of law-thus reviewable.
Further, even where the ultimate decision is discretionary-where the
statute has specific provisions that must be met and then the Attorney
General still has discretion to grant relief-some courts find the abil3
ity to review the underlying statutory criteria.'
The need for judicial review of BIA decisions persists after the
REAL ID Act. Despite the fact that the courts repeatedly label deportation as a civil proceeding and not punishment-thus noncitizens are
not given the same due process protection they would have if it were a
criminal proceeding-deportation may result in harsh consequences
and arguably warrants review. 14 With the immigration judges and the
BIA swamped with cases' 5 and the high stakes for noncitizens-especially those who have already been subjected to extreme cruelty-the
arguments for judicial review gain more strength. Although the
counterarguments, including Congress's plenary power over immigration, deference to Congress, and the need to increase efficiency all
deserve attention, they do not overshadow the continued need for
judicial review. Even though courts should give the required deference to discretionary decisions where it is statutorily required, the
(U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Wash., D.C.), Aug.-Sept. 2005, at 1, available at www.usdoj.gov/
civil/oil/9news8_.9.pdf.
11 See infra note 146 and accompanying text.
12 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(a) (2) (D).
13 See Jean v. Gonzales, 452 F.3d 392, 395-96 (5th Cir. 2006); Wendtland, supra
note 10, at 4 ("For example, section 242(a) (2) (B)'s restriction on review of discretionary decisions had been held not to preclude review of threshold factual questions
that are non-discretionary in nature, such as whether an alien has accrued the requisite 'continuous physical presence' for cancellation of removal ...
14 See infra notes 164-67 and accompanying text.
15 See Cathy Catterson, Changes in Appellate Caseload and Its Processing,48 ARIz. L.
REv. 287, 295-96 (2006) (describing how the BIA's increasing caseload started in the
1990s, and that in 2001 the "BIA had more than 57,000 cases pending").
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courts must retain jurisdiction over constitutional claims and questions of law. After all, judicial review is the special function of the
courts, 16 and the courts have the power to determine their own jurisdiction. 17 The courts should hesitate to abdicate this role, especially
given the consequences facing the petitioners who lose their
appeals. 18 Thus, there is still a need for judicial review, and the Court
should hold that the determination of extreme cruelty is within Article III jurisdiction.
This Note examines the extent to which the REAL ID Act has
affected and should affect judicial review of BIA decisions by the circuit courts, specifically the courts' ability to review determinations
regarding "extreme cruelty" in the context of battered spouses and
children seeking relief in the special form of cancellation of
removal. 19 Part I examines the organization of immigration courts
and the impact of the REAL ID Act. Part II looks at the distinction
between "discretionary decisions" and "questions of law." Part III
turns to the judicial decisions of the Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits,
on whether the determination of "extreme cruelty" is subject to judicial review or whether it is a discretionary decision. Part IV considers
the common arguments that are proffered in favor of stripping the
courts' jurisdiction over immigration decisions. Finally, Part V concludes that despite the argument against judicial review, the need for
judicial review outweighs any drawbacks, and that the Supreme Court
should adopt the view of the Ninth Circuit.
I.

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE DECISIONS OF THE IMMIGRATION COURTS

This Part first examines the necessary background to understand
the structure, the location, and the powers of the immigration courts.
Second, it examines how the courts have traditionally reviewed immigration decisions. Third, this Part addresses the impact of the REAL
ID Act of 2005.
A.

The Organizationof the Immigration Courts

The Immigration Courts are not Article III courts, but are Article
I courts organized under the Department ofJustice and the Attorney
16 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803).
17 United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 291 (1947) ("'[The
Court] alone necessarily had jurisdiction to decide whether the case was properly
before it."' (quoting United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563, 573 (1906))).
18 See infra notes 164-67.
19 See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229b(b)(2) (West 2005 & Supp. 2006); infra note 95 and
accompanying text.
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General. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) formerly
filled this function, 20 but in 2003, a major reorganization under the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 replaced the INS with the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS). The DHS took over many of the roles
of the INS-including prosecuting the government's cases against
noncitizens-and took these functions out of the Attorney General's
power. 2 1 Despite the creation of the DHS, the Department of Justice
still maintains an active role in immigration law. The Executive Office
for Immigration Review (EOIR), an agency within the Department of
Justice, which the Attorney General "direct[s] and regulate[s]," is in
charge of adjudicating immigration cases. 22 Under the EOIR are the
Office of the Chief Immigration Judge (OCIJ), the BIA, and the
Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer (OCAHO). The
immigration judges are organized under the OCIJ, and the BIA is in
charge of hearing appeals from the immigration judges. 23 The BIA is
still under the Attorney General, who holds the power to review and
modify BIA decisions, "but typically exercises this power only when a
24
case raises exceptionally important questions of law or policy."
B. JudicialReview of BIA Decisions
A noncitizen must meet certain prerequisites to get judicial
review of BIA decisions. The removal order must be administratively
20 From 1940 to 2003, the INS was the main authority regarding immigration,
and its "functions included law enforcement, inspection of arriving passengers, prosecution at administrative hearings, detention of noncitizens in connection with immigration proceedings, and processing applications for various immigration benefits."
STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 2 (4th ed. 2005).
21
Id. at 2-3. The DHS contains two enforcement agencies, the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP), which mainly functions at the border, and the
Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), which mainly functions in
the interior. Id. at 3. The DHS also has a service component, the U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Services (USCIS). Id. at 4. ICE is responsible for prosecuting cases
against noncitizens before the Immigration Judges. Id. at 639-40. For a helpful organizational chart, see id. at 6.
22 Id. at 4 (citing Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, §§ 1101,
1102(3), 116 Stat. 2135, 2273-74 (codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. § 521 (Supp. II
2002) and 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (Supp. II 2002)).
23 Id.
24 Id. at 642; see id. at 4-5 (describing this power); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g)
(2006) ("Except as Board decisions may be modified or overruled by the Board or the
Attorney General, decisions of the Board, and decisions of the Attorney General, shall
be binding on all officers and employees of the Department of Homeland Security or
immigration judges in the administration of the immigration laws of the United
States."); id. § 1003.1(h) (1) (requiring that "[t]he Board shall refer to the Attorney
General for review of its decision all cases that" the Attorney General requests).
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final2 5 and the noncitizen must file a petition for review within thirty
days of the final removal order "with the court of appeals for the judicial circuit in which the immigration judge completed the proceedings."' 26 The noncitizen must exhaust all administrative remedies2 7
and the noncitizen must not be statutorily barred from judicial
review.

28

Despite consular absolutism, which is the inability of courts to
review the denial of visas, 29 "only occasionally-until recently-have
courts held the immigration decisions of administrative officials
immune from judicial review." 30 However, the courts have traditionally deferred to Congress's plenary power in the field of immigration
law. 3 ' "The reasons for this extraordinary deference are indeed complex, but it would seem that they are bound up in the notion that the
judiciary does not belong in areas of foreign policy which may impli25 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1) (2000) (providing for judicial review of "final" removal
orders).
26 Id. § 1252(b)(1)-(2).
27 See Yan Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 201 F. App'x 434, 436-37 (9th Cir. 2006) (dismissing one of the noncitizen's petitions for review because the circuit court did not
have jurisdiction where the noncitizen failed to exhaust her claim before the BIA);
Galvez Pifieda v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 833, 837 (10th Cir. 2005) ("Failure to exhaust
administrative remedies by not first presenting a claim to to the BIA deprives this
court ofjurisdiction to hear it."); 3 Immigr. L. Serv. 2d (West) § 15:13, at 15-16 (2006)
("In cases involving adjustment of status prior to removal proceedings, several courts
have denied review based primarily on the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies finding that review is barred because applicants could renew their requests
during removal proceedings.").
28 See infra note 62 and accompanying text (describing the categories 8 U.S.C.A.
§ 1252 (a) (2) (West 2005) bars from review).
29 See Saavedra Bruno v. Albright, 197 F.3d 1153, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding
that consular officers have the "exclusive authority to review applications for visas"
and citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1104(a), 1201 (a) (1994)); see also Stephen H. Legomsky, Fear
and Loathing in Congress and the Courts: Immigration andJudicialReview, 78 TEX. L. REV.
1615, 1619-23 (2000) (noting that it is well settled that the courts lack jurisdiction to
review the denial of visas by consular officers under the doctrine of consular absolutism); Maria Zas, ConsularAbsolutism: The Need forJudicialReview in the Adjudication of
Immigrant Visas for Permanent Residence, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 577, 591 (2004)
("Almost all the courts upholding the consular absolutism doctrine argue that consular officers' decisions are political, and as such, are immune from judicial review.").
30 LEGOMSKY, supra note 20, at 727.
31 Legomsky, supra note 29, at 1616-19; Chris Nwachukwu Okeke & James A.R.
Nafziger, United States MigrationLaw: Essentialsfor Comparison, 54 Am.J. COMP. L. 531,
544 (2006) ("A cardinal doctrine of United States constitutional law is that Congress
has an inherent, plenary power in matters of immigration."); see also infra notes
150-54 and accompanying text (discussing the courts' deference to Congress).
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cate political questions. '3 2 Decisions regarding deportation-now
called removal-orders were reviewable until 1996, usually through
habeas corpus. 33 However, the shortcoming of habeas review was that
the noncitizen could not seek this form of relief until he or she was
"incustody."3 4 In deportation cases, the noncitizen is often not
detained until after an order of deportation is issued, but certain categories of noncitizens are mandatorily detained pending a removal
35
hearing.
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 36 was enacted in
1952, and although it has been repeatedly amended, it "remains the
centerpiece of United States immigration law, providing the modern
statutory framework for controlling the exclusion, admission and
removal of non-citizens. '37 In 1955, the Supreme Court recognized
that "the legislative history of both the Administrative Procedure Act
and the 1952 Immigration Act supports [the noncitizen's] right to full
judicial review of ...deportation order[s]" 38 and held "that there is a
right of judicial review of deportation orders other than by habeas
' 39
corpus and that the remedy sought here is an appropriate one.
Thus, under the INA, before 1996, noncitizens could get judicial
32 Jeffrey A. Bekiares, Note, In Country, on Parole, out of Luck-Regulating Away
Alien Eligibilityfor Adjustment of Status Contrary to CongressionalIntent and Sound Immigration Policy, 58 FLA. L. REV. 713, 721 (2006); see also De Sandoval v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 440
F.3d 1276, 1279 (11th Cir. 2006) ("Deference to an agency's interpretation of a statute 'is especially appropriate in the immigration context where officials exercise especially sensitive political functions that implicate questions of foreign relations.'"
(quoting INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999))).
33 Legomsky, supra note 29, at 1623; see also INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 306
(2001) ("Until the enactment of the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act, the sole
means by which an alien could test the legality of his or her deportation order was by
bringing a habeas corpus action in district court.").
34 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(4) (2000); see Mojica v. Reno, 970 F. Supp. 130, 164
(E.D.N.Y. 1997) ("In the immigration context courts have also held that physical
restraint is not required for habeas jurisdiction. Where the petitioner is subject to a
final order of deportation, the 'custody' requirement is satisfied, particularly where
the alien has been released on condition of posting a bond.").
35 For example, federal law requires the mandatory detention of noncitizens who
are inadmissible or deportable for having committed certain criminal offenses, 8
U.S.C. § 1226(c) (1) (2000), and also requires the mandatory detention of noncitizen
suspected terrorists. Id. § 1226a (Supp. IV 2004).
36 Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
37 Sara A. Rodriguez, Note, Exile and the Not-So-Lawful Permanent Resident: Does
International Law Require a Humanitarian Waiver of Deportationfor the Non-Citizen Convicted of Certain Crimes?, 20 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 483, 488 (2006).
38 Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 51-52 (1955).
39 Id. at 52.
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review of deportation orders either by habeas corpus or "by seeking
declaratory judgments or injunctions under the Administrative Proce4
dure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 703."4o In 1961, under former INA section 106,'
Congress enabled noncitizens to file petitions for review directly with
the courts of appeals. 42 Thus, under the INA, before 1996, noncitizens could getjudicial "review of the agency's discretionary denial of
relief from exclusion or deportation" 4 3 either through seeking habeas
review in the district court or by filing a petition for review with the
44
court of appeals.
In 1996, with the enactment of AEDPA and IIRIRA, the congressional attitude greatly changed. AEDPA focused on limiting judicial
review regarding criminal noncitizens. It enlarged the aggravated felony category to include more crimes and limited the relief available to
criminal noncitizens. 45 "IIRIRA clearly intended to restrict federal
court jurisdiction in the area of immigration enforcement." 4 6 IIRIRA
severely limited the petition for review with provisions that
purport[ed] to bar judicial review of whole categories of removal
orders, prohibit review of most denials of discretionary relief, make
several forms of action and otherjudicial remedies unavailable, and
40 LEGOMSKY, supra note 20, at 728; see also Legomsky, supra note 29, at 1623
("Before the emergence of positive statutory law on the subject, the courts assumed
that deportation orders . . . were reviewable in court."). Previously, in Heikkila v.
Barber, 345 U.S. 229 (1953), the Court acknowledged that the Immigration Act of
1917 limited judicial review of deportation to habeas corpus and held that "deportation orders remain immune to direct attack." Id. at 236.
41 Former INA section 106 was repealed in 1996 by IIRIRA. LEGOMSKY, supra
note 20, at 728.
42 Id.
43 Aaron G. Leiderman, Note, Preserving the Constitution's Most Important Human
Right: Judicial Review of Mixed Questions Under the REAL ID Act, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
1367, 1369-70 (2006).
44 See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 306, 313 n.37 (2001).
45 1 Immigr. L. Serv., supra note 27, § 1:26, at 1-34 (noting that AEDPA provided
for "preclusion of judicial review of final orders of deportation that are based on
certain convictions (aggravated felony, controlled substances, firearms, certain miscellaneous crimes, and multiple crimes involving moral turpitude), [and] denial of INA
§ 212(c) [8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(c) (West 2005)] relief from deportation for such aliens,
expedited deportation of such aliens, and expansion of the definition of an aggravated felony"); see also Lenni B. Benson, Making PaperDolls: How Restrictions onJudicial
Review and the Administrative Process Increase Immigration Cases in the Federal Courts, 51
N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 37, 41 & n.10 (2007) (discussing how noncitizens convicted of an
aggravated felony are barred from relief via petitions for review, and that the courts
decide whether the crime is an aggravated felony within the meaning of the INA).
46 3 Immigr. L. Serv., supra note 27, § 15:13, at 15-18.
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erect several other barriers to judicial review of administrative deci47
sions in removal cases.

Some of the categories explicitly excepted from judicial review
included removal orders for crimes, denials of discretionary relief,
expedited removal, and "other provisions limit[ing] the forms, methods, and timing of actions brought to challenge various types of
removal-related decisions. ' 48 Despite these limitations, IIRIRA "does
not preclude review of INS' determination that an alien is statutorily
ineligible for a form of discretionary relief. Similarly, review should
still be available to challenge INS' violation of its own regulations or
operating practices or where INS fails to exercise its discretionary
authority. ' 49 IIRIRA and AEDPA also attempted to ban review via
habeas corpus, but the Court in INS v. St. Cyi ° held that absent
explicit language precluding habeas-which came later in the REAL
ID Act 5 1-the Court should interpret IIRIRA and AEDPA to avoid a
52
conflict with the Suspension Clause.
C.

The Impact of the REAL ID Act of 2005

President Bush signed the REAL ID Act on May 11, 2005 as part
of the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act. 5 3 The REAL ID
Act contained five titles that respectively dealt with asylum and
removal; drivers' licenses; border security; H-2B temporary worker
54
provisions; and Australian E nonimmigrant and EB-3 nurses visas.
Some of the significant changes made regarding removal are that the
REAL ID Act bars review of "any discretionary judgment, decision or
47 LEGOMSKY, supra note 20, at 728.
48 Legomsky, supra note 29, at 1624.
49 1 Immigr. L. & Def. 3d (West) § 10:22 (2006).
50 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
51 See Benson, supra note 45, at 43 ("[T]he REAL ID Act ... explicitly bar[s]
habeas corpus review of removal orders ....[This] has meant a transfer of all habeas
petitions from the district court to the appeals courts."); Wendtland, supra note 10, at
3 ("In the REAL ID Act, Congress took the Supreme Court up on its invitation to
provide criminal aliens with an adequate alternative to district court habeas review.").
52 St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 305. The Court decided that although a provision of
AEDPA was tided, "Elimination of Custody Review by Habeas Corpus," its text did not
mention habeas corpus, but rather, "merely repeal[ed] a subsection of the 1961 statute amending the judicial review provisions of the 1952 Immigration and Nationality
Act." Id. at 308-09. Further, IIRIRA addressed 'Judicial review" but did not "explicitly mention habeas, or 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Accordingly, neither provision speaks with
sufficient clarity to bar jurisdiction pursuant to the general habeas statute." Id. at
312-13.
53 1 Immigr. L. Serv., supra note 27, § 1:88, at 1-21.
54 Id.

2046

NOTRE

DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 82:5

action made in removal proceedings" and "severely limit[s] judicial
review of removal orders." 55 "It prohibits habeas corpus review of
removal orders and makes the U.S. courts of appeals the only courts
with jurisdiction over review of removal orders." 5 6 Whereas St. Cyr
rejected AEDPA and IIRIRA's attempt to bar habeas corpus review for
noncitizens in removal due to is lack of specificity, 5 7 the REAL ID Act
answered the Court and explicitly made the petition for review the
exclusive means of review. 58 Also, the REAL ID Act specifically provides for judicial review of "constitutional claims or questions of law
raised upon a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of
appeals in accordance with this section." 59 In Papageorgiouv. Gonza/es, 60 the court held that the REAL ID Act
evidenced . . . [Congress's] intent to restore judicial review of constitutional claims and questions of law presented in petitions for
review of final removal orders .... [With] passage of the Act, Congress . . . repealed all jurisdictional bars to . . . [the court's] direct
review of constitutional claims and questions of law in final removal
61
orders.
As the law now stands, post-REAL ID, the courts cannot review
certain matters. These prohibitions on judicial review include
"[r] eview relating to section 1225(b) (1) of this title . . . [d]enials of
62
discretionary relief ... [and] . . . [o]rders against criminal aliens.
But, the statute also carves out a clear exception allowing for
"U]udicial review of certain legal claims . . . constitutional claims or
'6 3
questions of law."
Thus, for a noncitizen to seek judicial review of a BIA decision,
she must first exhaust all administrative proceedings, have a final
removal order, and file a petition for review with the court of appeals
55

Id.

56

Id.

57

See supra note 52.

58

8 U.S.C.A. § 1252 (a) (5) (West 2005) (codifying the rule that, with some excep-

tions, the petition for review to the appropriate circuit court is the only available form
ofjudicial review, "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory) including section 2241 of Title 28, or any other habeas corpus provision").
59
60

Id. § 1252(a) (2) (D).
413 F.3d 356 (3d Cir. 2005).

61 Id. at 358 (holding that although the court had jurisdiction to review the constitutional claim-a due process challenge to the BIA's summary affirmance of the IJ's
decision-the court had previously held that these challenges are without merit); see
Zitter, supra note 9, § 13.
62 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(a) (2); see generally Wendtland, supra note 10.
63

8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(a) (2) (D); see generally Wendtland, supra note 10.
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64
in the circuit in which the immigration judge sat within thirty days.
Further, she must get around the fence in immigration law that prohibits the review of discretionary decisions; she must frame her appeal
as a constitutional claim or question of law, 65 for which the courts of
appeals explicitly have a grant of jurisdiction from the REAL ID Act.
The question remains how the courts have interpreted and how the
courts should interpret "constitutional claims and questions of law" in
the immigration context. How much wiggle room does the statutory
grant give the courts to review certain types of decisions?

II.

SEPARATING DISCRETIONARY DETERMINATIONS FROM QUESTIONS OF
LAW SUBJECT

To

REVIEW

The REAL ID Act's apparently simple language that a court cannot review discretionary decisions, but can review constitutional
claims or questions of law, creates controversy because no statutory
provision defines these terms. According to the legislative history, this
jurisdictional grant was meant to be an adequate substitute for habeas
review; thus, the statutory grant should cover at least those issues that
were reviewable through habeas corpus, which are "constitutional and
statutory-construction questions." 66 The legislative history suggests
that a question of law "inquires into the meaning of statutory language in the context of undisputed or assumed facts." 6 7 "Definitions
of law typically invoke the characteristic of generality . .

.

. [L] egal

questions in the immigration context are traditionally understood as
pertaining to challenges to agency statutory construction since such

claims relate to the agency's administration of the statute generally."68
However, given that courts have the power to determine their
own jurisdiction, 69 they are able to interpret what constitutes a legal

claim and what is discretionary. The Fifth and the Tenth Circuits,
respectively, have described discretionary decisions as decisions which
are "not self-explanatory," 70 or which "involve a 'judgment call.'"71
64 See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
65 See Benson, supra note 45, at 52 ("Knowing there is no judicial review of the
discretionary decision, an attorney may now recharacterize litigation to raise constitutional or statutory issues. Barring review of the act of discretion has frequently only
shifted the litigation strategy not eliminated litigation.").
66 H.R. REP. No. 109-72, at 175 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 240,
299-300; see also Wendtland, supra note 10 (discussing the REAL ID Act's legislative
history).
67 Wendtland, supra note 10, at 5.
68 Leiderman, supra note 43, at 1382.
69

See supra note 17.

70

Wilmore v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 524, 527 (5th Cir. 2006).
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The courts of appeals agree that certain decisions are clearly discretionary. The courts have held that the determination of "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" 7 2 is discretionary. 73 Even
before the passage of the REAL ID Act, courts had held that reviewing
claims of "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" was discretionary.74 Thus, their jurisdiction regarding this question was undis75
turbed by the REAL ID Act.

While some courts are reluctant to call anything and everything a
question of law, 76 which would completely tear down the fence
prohibiting judicial review, the underlying justification for this position seems to rest on congressional intent: "[T]he REAL ID Act
reflects a congressional intent to preserve [a] broad effort to streamline immigration proceedings and to expedite removal while restoring
judicial review of constitutional and legal issues." 77 "'[T]he purpose... is to permitjudicial review over those issues that were historically reviewable on habeas- constitutional and statutory-construction
71

Perales-Cumpean v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 977, 982 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting

Sabido Valdivia v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 1144, 1149 (10th Cir. 2005)).
72 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) (1) (D) (2000). For nonpermanent residents to qualify
for cancellation of removal and adjustment of status, the noncitizen must have been
continuously physically present for ten years, be of good moral character, not have
been convicted of certain offenses, establish "that removal would result in exceptional
and extremely unusual hardship to the alien's spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence," and
get the favorable discretion of the Attorney General. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229b(b) (1) (West
2005 & Supp. 2006).
73 De La Vega v. Gonzales, 436 F.3d 141, 144 (2d Cir. 2006); see also MartinezRosas v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 926, 930 (9th Cir. 2005) ("[W]e lack jurisdiction to review
the IJ's subjective, discretionary determination that Martinez-Rosas did not demon-

strate

'exceptional

and

extremely

unusual

hardship'

under

8

U.S.C.

§ 1229b(b) (1) (D).-).
74 See Romero-Torres v. Ashcroft, 327 F.3d 887, 888 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Gonzalez-Oropeza v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 321 F.3d 1331, 1333 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that
"the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship determination is a discretionary
decision not subject to review").
75 See Tobar v. Gonzales, 200 F. App'x 796, 799 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing Ferry v.
Gonzales, 457 F.3d 1117, 1130 (10th Cir. 2006)); Martinez-Rosas, 424 F.3d at 929 (citing Romero-Torres, 327 F.3d at 888, 890-91).
76 See Tobar, 200 F. App'x at 799; see also Higuit v. Gonzales, 433 F.3d 417, 420
(4th Cir. 2006) ("We are not free to convert every immigration case into a question of
law, and thereby undermine Congress's decision to grant limited jurisdiction over
matters committed in the first instance to the sound discretion of the Executive."),
cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2973 (2006).
77 Grass v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 876, 879 (8th Cir. 2005) cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1793
(2006); see also Tobar, 200 F. App'x at 799 (stating that Congress had a "clear intent to
eliminate jurisdiction over discretionary decisions").
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questions, not discretionary or factual questions.'" 7 8 However, some
circuits are more willing than others to interpret this jurisdictional
79
grant broadly and to label decisions discretionary less frequently.
Overall, courts regard factual determinations as unreviewable
(beyond the bounds of the fence around immigration law), but consider questions of law within their jurisdiction (on the court's side of
the fence). The difference is that questions of law are general, but
facts are "highly specific." 80 However, which category each type of
decision fits into has largely been left up to the courts.8 1 Regarding
discretionary decisions, as the St. Cyr Court noted,
habeas courts traditionally reviewed two types of discretionary decisions: first, an agency's failure to even consider exercising discretion
based on its legal error in interpreting the eligibility requirements
for a form of relief from removal (an eligibility decision) and second, an unfavorable exercise of that discretion (a merits
decision) .82
Courts have labeled the following decisions discretionary: denials
of adjustment of status, 8 3 denials to grant continuances,8 4 and "the
existence of 'changed circumstances' that materially affect eligibility
for asylum. '85 Once these decisions are labeled discretionary, they are
beyond the fence and unreachable by the court's review.
Constitutional claims and questions of law clearly fall within the
nondiscretionary category-and therefore are reviewable by Article III
courts since they are on the court's side of the fence. The plain statu78 Ramadan v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 1218, 1222 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting H.R. REP.
No. 109-13, at 175 (2005) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.AN 240, 300).
79 See infra notes 86-93 and accompanying text.
80 Leiderman, supra note 43, at 1382.
81 "In all, the REAL ID Act restores a baseline ofjurisdiction to review 'constitutional claims or questions of law' . . . to be fleshed out on a case-by-case basis in the
circuit courts." Id. at 1376 (focusing on the inadequacy of the REAL ID Act in
addressing the court's jurisdiction over mixed questions of law and fact and arguing
that the court should consider many mixed questions since the REAL ID Act was
meant to be an equal substitute for habeas corpus review).
82 Id. at 1378 (citing INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 303-04, 307 (2001)).
83 Higuit v. Gonzales, 433 F.3d 417, 420 (4th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct.
2973 (2006).
84 Grass v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 876, 877-78 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct.
1793 (2006).
85 Ramadan v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 1218, 1221-22 (9th Cir. 2005) ("Should there
be any doubt about the meaning of the term 'questions of law' in the REAL ID Act,
the legislative history makes it abundantly clear this term refers to a narrow category
of issues regarding statutory construction.").
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tory language of the REAL ID Act explicitly makes this exception. 6
The issue is what decisions this categorical exception encompasses.
Due process claims are clearly within the purview of the statutory
exemption, and are thus reviewable. 8 7 Heightened standards
imposed by the Attorney General have also been defined as legal
claims and are reviewable. 88 In Succar v. Ashcroft,8 9 the First Circuit
held that the issue-whether a regulation was promulgated within the
scope of the Attorney General's authority-was a pure question of law
and statutory interpretation, not discretion, and was therefore reviewable by the court.90
In Benslimane v. Gonzales,9 1 the Seventh Circuit, in an opinion
written by Judge Posner, decided that "[t]he final decision in this case
is the order removing Benslimane, which is nondiscretionary and
therefore reviewable by us." 9 2 The court further elaborated, in dicta,
without sharing its own position on the issue, that
[o]ther courts have recognized an even broader scope of judicial
review of denials of continuances. They have pointed out that section 1252(a) (2) (B) (ii) closes the door only to the review of rulings
"the authority for which isspecified under this subchapter to be in
the discretion of the Attorney General," and that rulings on
motions for a continuance are not among those specified (that is,
93
explicitly listed).
Drawing this distinction is not always clear. 94 Thus, the key distinction between discretionary and nondiscretionary-constitutional
86 REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, § 106(a)(1)(A)(iii), 119 Stat.
231, 310 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (2) (D)).
87 Contreras-Rodriguez v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 462 F.3d 1314, 1316 (11th Cir. 2006)
(holding that the court could review the denial of a motion to reopen where there
was a "constitutional challenge to the government's failure to provide [the deportee]
with notice of the deportation hearing"); Martinez-Rosas v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 926,
930 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that the court did have jurisdiction to review the due
process claims); Hamid v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 642, 645 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that
the court could review the due process claim due to the jurisdiction exception for
"constitutional claims or questions of law" in the REAL ID Act); Papageorgiou v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 356, 358-59 (3d Cir. 2005) (deciding that the court had jurisdiction to
review the constitutional due process claim).
88 Jean v. Gonzales, 452 F.3d 392, 396 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that a claim of
ultra vires is a question of law because it is a claim regarding statutory construction).
89 394 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2005).
90 Id. at 19; see Bekiares, supra note 32, at 728-29.
91 430 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2005).
92 Id. at 831.
93

Id. at 832 (quoting 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) (West 2005)).

94 Grass v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1793
(2006).
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claims or questions of law-is left to the courts, which can lead to
differing results as to the fence's boundaries, namely in the case of
"extreme cruelty," to which we now turn.

III.

DECIDING ON WHICH SIDE OF THE FENCE TO PUT
"EXTREME CRUEI.T"'

The courts of appeals are split about whether the BLA's determination of "extreme cruelty" is a discretionary determination or a question of law. They cannot agree where to build the fence on this issue.
The Fifth and Tenth Circuits have held the "extreme cruelty" determination to be a discretionary decision and unreviewable by the courts,
whereas the Ninth Circuit has held it to be a nondiscretionary legal
standard, and thus reviewable.
Pursuant to the special rule for a battered noncitizen spouse or
child, the battered noncitizen may qualify for cancellation of
removal if,
(i) (I) the alien has been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty by a spouse or parent who is... a United States citizen... ; [or]
(II) ... who is or was a lawful permanent resident... ;
(ii) the alien has been physically present in the United States
for a continuous period of not less than 3 years ...;
(iii) the alien has been a person of good moral character during such period ... ;
(iv) the alien is not inadmissible under [certain provisions]; ...
and
hardship to the alien,
(v) the removal would result in extreme
95
the alien's child, or the alien's parent.
The regulations define, in pertinent part, that "battery or
extreme cruelty" includes, "but is not limited to, being the victim of
any act or threatened act of violence" or "[p]sychological or sexual
abuse."9 6 The regulations further provide that "[o]ther abusive acts
may also be acts of violence under certain circumstances, including
acts that ... may not initially appear violent but that are a part of an
97
overall pattern of violence.
This special rule for relief, formerly codified at INA section 244,
became part of the INA with the enactment of the Violence Against
Women Act of 1994 (VAWA),98 to protect noncitizen spouses and chil95
96

8 U.S.C.A. § 1229b(b) (2) (A) (West 2005 & Supp. 2006).
8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(1)(vi) (2006).

97 Id.
98 Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 8, 18 & 42 U.S.C.).
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dren who were victims of domestic violence. 99 The Ninth Circuit, in
Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 10 0 has interpreted extreme cruelty as the "nonphysical aspects of domestic violence."'' 1 Since the definition of
extreme cruelty includes acts that "are a part of an overall pattern of
violence"'1 2 the court held that this "protect[ed] women against
manipulative tactics aimed at ensuring the batterer's dominance and
control" and "protected against the extreme concept of domestic violence, rather then mere unkindness."' 10 3 In Hernandez, the court
decided that although the egregious physical abuse-which would
surely meet the standard of battery or extreme cruelty-took place in
Mexico, the husband's seemingly nonviolent actions in the United
States to lure his wife back to Mexico were part of the cycle of violence
and rose to the level of extreme cruelty.' 0 4 Thus, the focus of a determination as to whether there has been extreme cruelty is on extreme,
nonphysical aspects of domestic violence, in order to cover those situations that may not amount to battery but are nonetheless part of an
overall pattern of violence.
A.

5
The Fifth Circuit's Decision in Wilmore v. Gonzales' 0

The Fifth Circuit, in Wilmore, dismissed an appeal to review a decision of the BIA "[b] ecause Congress has stripped courts ofjurisdiction
to review the Attorney General's discretionary decisions under [8
U.S.C.A. §] 1229b(b) (2)."106 In Wilmore, the former INS served Kathleen Wilmore with a notice to appear in February 2003, after she had
been continuously present in the United States since 1981, but out of

100

99

Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 345 F.3d 824, 832 (9th Cir. 2003).
345 F.3d 824.

101
102

Id. at 839.
8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(1)(vi) (2006).

103

Hernandez, 345 F.3d at 840.

104 Id. at 835-41. "Against this violent backdrop . . . [his] actions in tracking
Hernandez down and luring her from the safety of the United States through false
promises and short-lived contrition are precisely the type of acts of extreme cruelty
that 'may not initially appear violent but that are part of an overall pattern of vio-

lence."' Id. at 840 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(1)(vi) (2003)). The Ninth Circuit has
continued to hold that extreme cruelty is not merely unkindness. Zhi Gang Wang v.
Gonzales, 164 F. App'x 564, 565 (9th Cir. 2006) (ruling that although "Wang's wife

verbally abused him, made him sleep on the couch, controlled his paychecks,
screened his correspondence with China, and deprived him of the 'good parts' of
food he purchased for the family table," this did not rise to the level of extreme
cruelty).
105 455 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 2006).
106 Id. at 525.
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status since 1983.107 She married a U.S. citizen in 1996 who then
applied on her behalf for an adjustment of status to make her a lawful
permanent resident, but her husband had since filed for divorce and
withdrawn his application. 10 8 Wilmore, although conceding her
deportability, sought relief through cancellation of removal under the
special rule for victims of domestic violence. 10 9 The immigration
judge determined that Wilmore had not met the "extreme cruelty"
requirement and the BIA dismissed her appeal on the same
grounds," 0 so Wilmore appealed to the Fifth Circuit to show
"extreme cruelty." The Fifth Circuit stated the accepted standard that
it "lack[ed] jurisdiction to review discretionary decisions under
§ 1229b but retain[ed] jurisdiction over purely legal and nondiscretionary questions."'1 Thus, the case turned on whether a determination of "extreme cruelty" was discretionary.
This presented a question of first impression for the Fifth Circuit.'

12

The court analogized to its previous holding that the

"extreme hardship" determination, under the same section, was discretionary, to also hold the "extreme cruelty" determination to be discretionary, because both terms were "'not self-explanatory and
reasonable men could differ"' as to their meaning.' 1 3 The court
addressed the lack of uniformity and the arguments in the other circuits, namely the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, regarding whether deter-

107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 526. Under the INA, the DHS has the burden of proving that a noncitizen is deportable, unless the noncitizen concedes deportability. The burden then
shifts to the noncitizen, even if deportable, to prove that he or she is eligible for
affirmative relief. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229a(c) (West 2005 & Supp. 2006). Thus, it is not
uncommon for noncitizens to concede deportability. Benson, supra note 45, at
49-51. Affirmative relief may cancel removal or even adjust the noncitizen to permanent resident status. Id. § 1229b(a)-(b).
110 Wilmore, 455 F.3d at 526.
111 Id. (citing Mireles-Valdez v. Ashcroft, 349 F.3d 213, 215-16 (5th Cir. 2003)).
112 The Fifth Circuit previously had opportunities to decide whether determining
extreme cruelty was discretionary, but instead avoided the issue by pointing out that
the same outcome-denial of relief-would be reached either way, such that the issue
did not need to be decided. Garnica-Villarreal v. Ashcroft, 123 F. App'x 625, 626 (5th
Cir. 2005) ("We need not resolve the jurisdictional question in this case because
Garnica is not entitled to relief."); Luna-Ramirez v. Ashcroft, 111 F. App'x 737, 738
(5th Cir. 2004) ("[W]e need not resolve the jurisdictional question in this case as
Luna is not entitled to relief.").
113 Wilmore, 455 F.3d. at 527 (quoting Moosa v. INS, 171 F.3d 994, 1013 (5th Cir.
1999)).
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mining "extreme hardship" was discretionary, before ultimately siding
14
with the Tenth Circuit.'
The court, in addition to an analogy to "extreme hardship" and
the Tenth Circuit's interpretation, examined the statutory text and
the impact of the REAL ID Act in reaching its conclusion. The court
focused on the literal use of the word "may" in the statute, the title of
the jurisdiction-stripping provision ("Matters not subject to judicial
review"), 115 and the location of the "extreme cruelty" provision under
"Denials of discretionary relief."1 16 The court, although recognizing
that the REAL ID Act gave the courts jurisdiction over "constitutional
claims or questions of law,"' 1 7 narrowly interpreted the Act as not
granting jurisdiction in the present case.' 1 8 It basically held that interpreting "extreme cruelty" was discretionary and not a question of
law.'

B.

19

120
The Tenth Circuit's Decision in Perales-Cumpean v. Gonzales

The Tenth Circuit in Perales-Cumpean, which the Fifth Circuit
relied on in Wilmore, held the determination of "extreme cruelty" to
be a discretionary decision of the BIA beyond the court's jurisdiction,
while rejecting the Ninth Circuit's view. 12 1 In Perales-Cumpean, the
petitioner sought relief in the special form of cancellation of removal
for battered spouses under 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229b(b) (2).122 The immigration judge denied relief, and the BIA affirmed, because "petitioner
had not satisfied the statutory requirement of showing that she had been
subject to extreme cruelty or battery by her spouse."'123 The BLA decided
that the petitioner's claims of name calling, insults, the use of derogatory language, and the lack of credible testimony regarding marital
114 Id. at 527-28; see infra Parts III.B-C.
115 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(a) (2) (B) (West 2005).
116 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) (2000); see Wilmore, 455 F.3d at 528. However,
according to St. Cyr, the title of the section is not controlling. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S.
289, 308 (2001) (holding that even though the title of the section was "Elimination of
Custody Review by Habeas Corpus," review via habeas corpus was still available
because the statutory text did not clearly exclude habeas corpus).
117 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(a)(2)(D).
118 Wilmore, 455 F.3d at 529.
119 Id. at 528.
120 429 F.3d 977 (10th Cir. 2005).
121 Id. at 979-80; see Tenth Circuit Rules that It LacksJurisdiction to Review Determinations of Extreme Cruelty and Adverse Credibility in Special Rule Cancellation Case, IMMiGR.
LITIG. BuLL. (U.S. Dep't of Justice, Wash., D.C.), Dec. 2005, at 14, available at
www.usdoj.gov/civil/oil/9newsl 2.pdf.
122 See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
123 Perales-Cumpean,429 F.3d at 980 (emphases added).
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124
rape did not meet the statutory requirement of "extreme cruelty."'
In deciding whether the Tenth Circuit had jurisdiction to review the
decision, the court looked to the jurisdictional statute and precedent
to conclude that the court could not review discretionary decisions,
but only nondiscretionary decisions. 25 The court interpreted discretionay decisions as those
that involve a 'judgment call" by the agency, or for which there is

"no algorithm" on which review may be based. .

.

. [Whereas]

[d]ecisions for which there is a clear standard, and for which no
contrast, may
evaluation of non-discretionary criteria is required, by 126
be considered non-discretionary and thus reviewable.
The court, like the Fifth Circuit in Wilmore, held that the determination of "extreme cruelty" was discretionary by analogizing to a previous decision holding that "exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship" was discretionary since it was a 'judgment call" and not a
"pure question of law."' 12 7 Overall, the court showed great deference
to Congress and Congress's decision not to more specifically define
what level of verbal abuse reaches "extreme cruelty" as evidence that it
28
was intended to be a decision made in the discretion of the agency.'
The court also expressly rejected the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Hernandez that extreme cruelty can be objectively assessed 129 and held

that the regulatory definition of "battery or extreme cruelty" itself
30
called for discretion in its interpretation.
C.

The Ninth Circuit's Decision in Hernandez v. Ashcroft

The Ninth Circuit, in Hernandez-contrary to the later decisions
of the Fifth and Tenth Circuits-held that it hadjurisdiction to review
the BIA's decision regarding "extreme cruelty" and to interpret for
itself the meaning of "extreme cruelty," because it was a nondiscretionary decision. I31 In Hernandez, a noncitizen-a victim of domestic
124
125
126

Id. at 981.
Id. at 982.
Id. (quoting Sabido Valdivia v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 1144, 1149 (10th Cir.

2005)).
127

Id. (quoting Morales Ventura v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1259, 1262 (10th Cir.

2005)).
128 Id. at 982-83.
129 Id. at 983; see infra note 135 and accompanying text.
130 Perales-Cumpean,429 F.3d at 984; 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(l)(vi) (2006).
131 Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 345 F.3d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 2003). It is important to
note that Hernandez was decided under IIRIRA's transitional rules which stated that
"'there shall be no appeal of any discretionary decision under section ... 244 ... of
the Immigration and Nationality Act."' Id. at 833 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2000)).
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violence by her legal permanent resident husband-was denied relief
by both the IJ and the BIA for failing to prove "extreme cruelty," and
was also denied discretionary relief even after meeting the statutory
32
requirements due to the petitioner's failing marriage.
On the issue of "extreme cruelty," rather than dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit ruled itself able to review the BIA's
decision, but only after deciding that the "extreme cruelty" determination was not a discretionary decision. 133 The court examined its previous decisions holding continuous physical presence and per se
categories of bad moral character nondiscretionary, whereas it had
held general determinations of moral character and extreme hardship discretionary.13 4 In determining whether interpreting "extreme
cruelty" is discretionary, the court rejected drawing an analogy to
"extreme hardship," but rather held that
[t]he existence or nonexistence of battery is clearly a factual determination, readily resolved by the application of a legal standard

defining battery to facts in question. Extreme cruelty provides an
inquiry into an individual's experience of mental or psychological
cruelty, an alternative measure of domestic violence that can also be
13
assessed on the basis of objective standards.

5

The court examined the statutory text to conclude that "nothing
in the text of the statute indicates that the phrase at issue is discretionary" unlike the statutory text regarding "'extreme hardship' which is
' 3 6
specifically committed to 'the opinion of the Attorney General. "
Looking at the present statutory text, the special rule allows a noncitizen to demonstrate that she "has been battered or subjected to
extreme cruelty." 137 However, at the time of this decision, the statutory text regarding "extreme hardship,"' 1 8 required that the "applicant be 'a person whose deportation would, in the opinion of the
Although decided before the REAL ID Act, Hernandez still decides the same issue,
whether the "extreme cruelty" determination is discretionary, and both the Fifth and
Tenth Circuits addressed it in their analyses.
132 Id. at 827-28; see also supra note 95 and accompanying text (explaining the
statutory requirements for a battered spouse to seek relief).
133 Hernandez, 345 F.3d at 833 ("Although there is no jurisdiction to review the
exercise of discretion under section 244, '[a]s to those elements of statutory eligibility
which do not involve the exercise of discretion, direct judicial review remains.'"
(quoting Kalaw v. INS, 133 F.3d 1147, 1150 (9th Cir. 1997))).
134 Id.
135 Id. at 834 (emphases added).
136 Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1), (3) (1994)).
137 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) (2) (i) (I) (2000).
138 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1), (3) (1994) (current version at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(b) (2) (i) (I) (2000)).
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Attorney General, result in extreme hardship." ' 1 39 Although this
clear difference in statutory language has been amended, the section
regarding "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" now more
closely resembles the structure of the "extreme hardship" statute, as it
is now and as it was at the time Hernandez was decided. Neither provision now has the phrase, "in the opinion of the Attorney General,"
making the determination of "extreme cruelty" still able to be read as
40
nondiscretionary.1
Further, the court based its holding on congressional intent.
Since this special rule for relief was originally enacted as a part of the
Violence Against Women Act, 4 1 the court reasoned that Congress
intended to "remedy the past insensitivity of the INS and other governmental entities to the dangers and dynamics of domestic violence,
[thus] it appears quite unlikely that Congress would have intended to
commit the determination of what constitutes domestic violence to
42
the sole discretion of immigration judges."'
The second issue the court reviewed regarded the discretionary
denial of relief even if the statutory requirements were met.
"Although the eligibility determination is clearly reviewable, IIRIRA
stripped us of jurisdiction to review the discretionary aspect of a decision to deny an application for adjustment of status."1 4 3 However, the
court noted that limitations on jurisdiction should be narrowly interpreted. 144 The court then reviewed the underlying reason that the
BIA denied petitioner relief Since the denial of discretionary relief
was based on the nonviability of the marriage, which is not a sufficient
reason to deny relief, the court held that "[t] he BIA has no discretion
to make a decision that is contrary to law.... Thus, the regulations
45
themselves limit the BIA's discretion to operating within the law."'
139 Hernandez, 345 F.3d at 834 n.8 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1), (3) (1994))
(emphasis added).
140 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) (2000).
141

See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.

142
143

Hernandez, 345 F.3d at 835.
Id. at 845 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101 note (2000)).

144

Id. (citing Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471,

482 (1999)).
145 Id. at 846. Other courts have similarly reviewed the basis for the BIA's decision. See Rodriguez-Castro v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 316, 319 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding
that even after the REAL ID Act, the court can still review whether the BIA properly
classified a state statute as a crime involving moral turpitude, because that is a pure
question of law); Mireles-Valdez v. Ashcroft, 349 F.3d 213, 217 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that since continuous presence is nondiscretionary, the court "has jurisdiction to
review whether Mireles-Valdez was ineligible for cancellation because he lacked the
required continuous presence").
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Even though the Ninth Circuit will not review discretionary decisions
of the BIA, here in Hernandez, it has more narrowly interpreted what
decisions are discretionary and even has been willing to examine the
underlying decision of the BIA to make sure that the BIA has not
exceeded its authority and the bounds of the law in determining when
it has cursorily labeled a decision discretionary.
Although the circuits are split about whether the "extreme cruelty" determination is discretionary, they do agree that the threshold
issue is whether a decision is discretionary. While this initial decision
can be outcome-determinative in that it strips the court ofjurisdiction
to review the decision, 146 effectively leaving the decision of the BIA
undisturbed, the Ninth Circuit has even interpreted that limitation
narrowly to allow for review of the underlying decision. 147 As a result,
courts could broadly interpret "constitutional claims or questions of
law" to allow them the opportunity to review the "extreme cruelty"
decision while still holding to the statute. Thus, for some courts, the
REAL ID Act significantly expands their jurisdiction by allowing them
to review questions of law and constitutional claims, due to a broad
interpretation of this jurisdictional "grant." However, courts have recognized that this grant also affects how noncitizens frame their
appeals, and this makes courts hesitant to label anything a "constitutional claim or question of law.' 48 The view that we ultimately
accept-that of the Ninth Circuit or that shared by the Tenth and
Fifth Circuits-depends a great deal on what interests we seek to
promote.
IV.

THE DRAWBACKS TO JUDICIAL REVIEW

Before defending judicial review, it is important to examine the
possible arguments for stripping the court of this function by building
a fence around some immigration decisions. Common arguments for
insulating immigration law from judicial review range from judicial
deference to Congress in a field that is better left to the political
branches to the increased delay and monetary costs associated with
review. 14 9 Thus, the two main arguments are first, the traditional plea
of deference to Congress in this field, and second, the need for efficiency and streamlining of the process.
146 See Hadwani v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 798, 800 (5th Cir. 2006) (collecting cases
holding that the courts "lack jurisdiction over petitions for review concerning the
discretionary denial of relief under 8 U.S.C. § 1255").
147 See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
148 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
149 Legomsky, supra note 29, at 1628-30.
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First, the courts have traditionally shown much deference to Congress in the area of immigration law due to Congress's plenary power
in this field. This tradition reaches back to the nineteenth century
when the Supreme Court decided two important cases that laid the
foundation for deference to the political branches in immigration
matters. 150 The basis for this deference is that immigration is related
to other powers delegated to Congress:
It is pertinent to observe that any policy toward aliens is vitally and
intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to
the conduct of foreign relations, the war power, and the maintenance of a republican form of government. Such matters are so
exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to
15
be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference. 1
In Ekiu v. United States, 15 2 the Court based Congress's power over
immigration on the inherent power of the sovereign, the Commerce
Clause, the Naturalization Clause, the war power, and the Necessary
and Proper Clause. 15 3 Further, the doctrine of consular absolutismwhereby the courts will not review visa denials-is another example of
I5 4
court's hands-off approach regarding certain issues in immigration.
The second oft-cited reason for restricting judicial review in
immigration law to limit judicial review is the need for efficiency.
There is both the intention to increase efficiency, as evidenced in the
recent reforms, and the need to do so, as evident from the increased
number of appeals. The major reorganizations of the BLA and the
appeals process evinced this intent to streamline the process. In 2002,

150 Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892) (holding that the power to
exclude foreigners is inherent in sovereignty and "belongs to the political department
of the government, and may be exercised either through treaties made by the President and Senate, or through statutes enacted by Congress"); Chae Chan Ping v.
United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) (stating that the power to exclude was "not
[a] question [ ] for judicial determination" and that "any just ground of complaint...
must be made to the political department of our government, which is alone competent to act upon the subject").
151 Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952).
152 142 U.S. 651.
153 Id. at 659; see also Rodriguez, supra note 37, at 526-27 (noting that despite the
lack of an "express provision in the United States Constitution delegating power to
Congress over immigration matters," the sources of this power are the Commerce
Clause, the Naturalization Clause, the "Migration or Importation" Clause, the war
powers, and the Necessary and Proper Clause).
154 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.

2060

NOTRE

DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 82:5

the Attorney General changed the appeal process to the BIA. 155 The
three-member panels that previously sat to hear an appeal were
replaced by single-member hearings. At the same time, the Attorney
General decreased the BIA from twenty-three to merely eleven members 156 by cutting out the more liberal judges. 157 To further reduce

the backlog of 55,000 appeals, the Attorney General instituted the
"'affirmance without opinion' by which most appeals are simply summarily affirmed without consideration of the actual merits of the
appeal."' 5 8 As a result of these changes, the number of appeals to the
circuit courts has staggeringly increased. 15 9 To give an example,
"[f]rom October 1999 through March 2002 there were a total of 4407
such petitions; from April 2002 through September 2004 there were
160
23,069-more than five times as many."
Echoing this desire to speed up and increase efficiency in this
process, President Bush, as part of his plan for immigration reform,
previously asked Congress to "end the cycle of endless litigation that
16
clogs our immigration courts and delays justice for immigrants." '
However, without judicial review in the areas where it is needed most,
justice may be permanently delayed. If the courts cannot see beyond
155 Recent Cases, Wang v. Attorney General, 423 F3d 260 (3d Cir. 2005) and Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2005), 119 HARv. L. REV. 2596, 2600
(2006).
Congress and the Executive have further enhanced their freedom from judicial constraint through the tools of administrative law: the main structures of
the immigration court system are regulations made, interpreted, and
enforced by the Attorney General. As a result, lawsuits challenging the
severe consequences of the 2002 BIA streamlining have failed. It may be the
case that U.S. law does not guarantee a better immigration court system,
even if it should.
Id. at 2601 (footnote omitted).
156 Id. at 2600.
157 Barbara Hines, An Overview of U.S. Immigration Law and Policy Since 9/11, 12
TEX. Hisp. J.L. & POL'v 9, 21 (2006).
158 Id.
159 Id. ("Because the majority of cases are simply administratively affirmed, the
federal courts have been inundated with appeals of the cases for which federal jurisdiction still exists. Thus, the result of this policy has simply been to shift the appeal
process to the federal courts.").
160 John R.B. Palmer et al., Why Are So Many People ChallengingBoard of Immigration
Appeals Decisions in Federal Court? An Empirical Analysis of the Recent Surge in Petitionsfor
Review, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 44 (2005); see also Benson, supra note 45, at 47-48
("Focusing on the period between 2000 and 2004, BIA appeals have soared almost
357% since 2000 and have more than doubled in every circuit since 2002.").
161 Francesco Isgro, President Outlines Strategy to Enhance Homeland Security Through
Comprehensive Immigration Reform, IMMIGR. LITIG. BULL. (U.S. Dep't of Justice, Wash.,
D.C.), Nov. 2005, at 1, available at www.usdoj.gov/civil/oil/9newsll.pdf.
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the insurmountable fence that Congress has constructed around these
areas of immigration law, how will we ever know if the BIA is getting it
right? If the cases are being reversed forty percent of the time in
some circuits, 162 are we willing to take that risk when it means certain
removal-a very severe consequence-for noncitizens in general, or
for the victims of domestic violence who may have truly suffered
extreme cruelty? This is not a risk that promotes justice and not a risk
that our courts-or the political branches-should be willing to take.
V.

THE CONTINUING NEED FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW: THE SUPREME
COURT SHOULD ACCEPT THE INTERPRETATION OF THE
NINTH CIRCUIT

Although the agreement between the Fifth and Tenth Circuits
seems to favor labeling the "extreme cruelty" determination a discretionary decision and putting it beyond the reach of the courts' jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has not yet spoken to the issue and could
still hold that the courts' jurisdiction encompasses review of "extreme
cruelty" determinations. This issue may take a while to reach the
Supreme Court, but when the Court speaks, it should decide that a
determination of "extreme cruelty" is a question of law and therefore
subject to judicial review by the courts. Despite arguments for barring

review, four reasons for accepting the Ninth Circuit interpretation
trump any of the drawbacks to judicial review. First, deportation,
while technically a civil proceeding, carries harsh consequences and
should carry more procedural protections, namely judicial review, as a
result. Second, the statutory text is open to being read as allowing for
the "extreme cruelty" determination to be nondiscretionary and thus
a question of law. Third, the incredible number of errors in the system must be checked and replaced by consistency.1 63 Fourth, there is
a need to promote judicial independence within the structural bias of
the system. Thus, the need for judicial review persists, in the interests
of all parties, to promote justice and is not outweighed by concerns
for efficiency or the traditional deference to Congress in this field.
First, the fallacy that removal is a civil proceeding is losing
strength as a justification for the lack of procedural protections. The
accepted view-as evidenced by majority opinions-has long been
that deportation is not punishment. 164 However, merely labeling the
procedure does not substantively change its nature. "A resident
162 See infra note 172 and accompanying text.
163 See infra note 172 and accompanying text.
164 See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 324 (2001); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S.
603, 613-14 (1960); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893).
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alien's right to due process should not be tempered by a classification
of the deportation proceeding as 'civil,' 'criminal,' or 'administrative.'
No matter the classification, deportation is punishment, pure and simple."' 65 Especially in the sympathetic cases of battered spouses and
children, deportation carries such harsh consequences for those who
have already been victims. The somberly lucid words of James
Madison, as quoted by Justice Field, illustrate just how heavy a consequence deportation can be:
"If the banishment of an alien from a country . . . where he may
have formed the most tender connections; where he may have
invested his entire property, and acquired property of the real and
permanent as well as the movabe and temporary kind; where he
enjoys, under the laws, a greater share of blessings of personal
security and personal liberty than he can elsewhere hope for;... if a
banishment of this sort be not a punishment, and among the severest of punishments, it would be difficult to imagine a doom to which
166
the name can be applied."
Thus, even if not "punishment," the consequences are serious, 1 67 and
judicial review should be allowed to protect the victims of domestic
violence and give them a fair chance at relief in the form of cancellation of removal.
Second, the statutory text is open to being read as allowing for
the determination of "extreme cruelty" to be discretionary. Examining the statutory interpretation arguments, the Ninth Circuit's distinction between the provisions regarding cruelty and hardship is
persuasive. Determining "extreme cruelty" was not specifically committed to the opinion of the Attorney General under the transitional
rule and also is not under the present statutory language. 168 Since the
"extreme cruelty" determination is part of the special rule for relief
for battered spouses and children, and was originally enacted as part
of the VAWA, 1 69 the Ninth Circuit's focus on the congressional intent
165 Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS, 516 F.2d 565, 572 (6th Cir. 1975) (DeMascio, J.,
dissenting).
166 Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 749 (FieldJ., dissenting) (quoting 4 THE DEBATES IN
THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

555 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836)); see also United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 269
(1905) (Brewer, J., dissenting) ("But it was not suggested, and indeed could not be,
that the deportation and exile of a citizen was not punishment. The forcible removal
of a citizen from his country is spoken of as banishment, exile, deportation, relegation
or transportation, but by whatever name called it is always considered a
punishment.").
167 Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 491 (1999).
168 See supra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.
169 See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
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to "remedy the past insensitivity of the INS . . . to . . . domestic violence"' 70 further strengthens the case for judicial review of "extreme
cruelty" determinations. Given that the courts have the power to
determine their own jurisdiction, 17 1 the statutory language stripping
judicial review over discretionary decisions should be narrowly interpreted and the jurisdiction grants broadly construed to encompass
the "extreme cruelty" determination.
Third, there are too many errors in the system which should be
corrected and replaced with a more consistent and accurate voice. A
prime example is the nearly forty percent reversal rate in the Seventh
Circuit which confirms that the immigration courts too often get it
wrong. 17 2 In the scathing words of Judge Posner,
the adjudication of these cases at the administrative level has fallen
below the minimum standards of legal justice ....

[I]t cannot be in

the interest of the immigration authorities, the taxpayer, the federal
judiciary, or citizens concerned with the effective enforcement of
the nation's immigration laws for removal orders to be routinely
nullified by the courts .... 173
The lack of resources available to the immigration judges is astonishing and plainly a factor in the percentage of reversals. 74 The
increase in petitions to the courts of appeals, though partly caused by
the increase in the number of cases heard by the BIA, is also due to
the noncitizen's perception of errors in the system and, therefore, his
or her desire to challenge the BIA's decision or its "affirmance without opinion.' 1 75 It is evident that the Attorney General's 2002 structuiral changes to the BIA and the review process have exacerbated the
170 Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 345 F.3d 824, 835 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting the Ninth
Circuit's focus on congressional intent).
171

See supra note 17.

172 Recent Cases, supra note 155, at 2596-97. "The problem of bad immigration
decisions was created by conditions among immigration judges; was magnified by
changes to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which oversees those judges;
and may be further exacerbated by measures to limit circuit court review." Id. at
2597; see also Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 829 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that
the Seventh Circuit, in the past year, had "reversed the [BIA] in whole or part in a
staggering 40 percent of the 136 petitions to review the Board that were resolved on
the merits").
173 Benslimane, 430 F.3d at 830.
174 Recent Cases, supra note 155, at 2599 (noting that in fiscal year 2005, the 215
immigration judges decided 352,287 cases, dealt with noncitizens of which only twelve
percent spoke English, and two-thirds of which were not represented by counsel).
175 Palmer et al., supra note 160, at 51 (noting that the "BIA's output has
increased by a factor of around two, the courts of appeals' input of petitions for
review has increased by a factor of closer to five").
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problem.1 76 The State Bar of Texas has also considered the need for
reform in this field via increased judicial review of removal
decisions.

1 77

Adding judicial review will help correct the errors while adding
much valued consistency. As Professor Legomsky persuasively argues,
"the mere prospect of judicial review hopefully encourages more
thoughtful, and more rational, decisionmaking in the first
instance. ' 178 "De novo review tends to further doctrinal coherence,
the theory goes, by empowering courts to ensure that agencies are
applying the law consistently."' 179 Further, "agency-generated 'precedent' hardly provides clear rules to guide government officials and
noncitizens."' 80 Thus,judicial review may help to restore an appropriate standard of justice and consistency.
Fourth, an external independent check by Article III judges on
the immigration judges and the BIA will help reassure the independence of their decisions. The immigration adjudication process is
largely insulated from review due to its structural isolation under the
Attorney General. Although the DHS is in charge of prosecuting the
noncitizens, the majority of these decisions ultimately lie in the hands
of the EOIR. 18 1 The crucial point is that 'judicial review by Article III
federal judges brings to the process a degree of independence that
even relatively secure administrative adjudicators cannot bring."182
In light of the consequences facing noncitizens in deportationespecially the victims of domestic violence-and the ability to broadly
interpret the statutory grant in order to replace the errors of the BIA
with consistency and check the EOIR's independence, the need for
increased judicial review to promote justice is not outweighed by concerns for efficiency or the traditional deference to Congress in this
field. Thus, the Court should hold that the determination of
"extreme cruelty" is not beyond the fence's boundary; but rather, is
subject to review.
CONCLUSION

This Note has endeavored to examine why there is such a pervasive theme of insulating the context of immigration law while at the
176 See supra note 172.
177 Proposed Annual Meeting Resolutions, 69 TEX. BJ. 450, 450 (2006).
178 Legomsky, supra note 29, at 1631.
179 Leiderman, supra note 43, at 1399-400.
180 Id. at 1400.
181 See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
182 Legomsky, supra note 29, at 1630.
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same time arguing that this history of fencing off immigration issues
needs to change. Looking at the historical development of the immigration courts and their traditional deference to Congress, it seems
that much of the insulation is just a byproduct of history. However,
when the underlying reasons for a policy are no longer applicable,
simple tradition should not be enough to maintain an errant system.
The courts should not simply defer to Congress because of a semantic
distinction between administrative proceedings and criminal ones.
Although the courts cannot possibly review every decision of the BLA,
the present state of judicial review is insufficient. Looking at the specific and tragic plight of battered spouses and children, these are the
victims that definitely need the added protection of the courts. Thus,
correcting the errors for those most susceptible to abuse is a good
starting point on the road to questioning whether we really want to
keep up the fence in immigration law at all or whether we just want to
give a key to the gates to those most in need of access to the courts.
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